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R. WTTERWULGHE *
1. Introduction
The acquisition of other companies is important to the development of a
capitalist economy. It facilitates the efficient use of resources by transferring,
without liquidation, whole enterprises into the hands of managements that can
handle them more effectively. Such acquisitions are important for the growth
of corporations [1], and perhaps even essential to their existence [2].
It is not surprising, therefore, that a market for the control of corporations
has developed behind the scenes of the traditional stock market [3]. In this
control market, the price of a bloc of shares is not determined by face value,
but by the control inherent in the bloc [4]. Thus, a control premium is paid for
a controlling bloc, which leads H.G. Manne to conclude that control is a
measurable and negotiable asset [5].
The technique of acquisition best suited to the control market is the
takeover bid [6]. Long used in Anglo-American countries, it was unknown to
continental Europe until recently. In Belgium, Holland, and France, however,
the takeover bid has rapidly become a normal means of acquisition, and
government and professional rules have been promulgated to regulate it. The
purpose of this article is to explore the rules applicable to takeover bids in
Belgium, and to examine the public agency which promulgates and enforces
these rules, the Commission Bancaire.
2. The Commission Bancaire
In 1964, the Belgian legislature placed takeover bids under the jurisdiction
of the Commission Bancaire (hereinafter the Commission), a public institution
responsible for the regulation of public securities issues [7]. The 1964 Act did
not contain provisions relating specifically to takeover bids, but merely sub-
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mitted them to the rules already developed by the Commission in regulating
public securities issues. The regulation of takeover bids in Belgium must.
therefore, be explored in the context of the history, purposes and procedures of
the Commission.
2.1. Establishment and purpose of the Commission Bancaire
The Commission was created to protect savings during the economic crises
of the 1930s [8]. The 1935 Arrat Royal dealt with the control of banks as well
as the regulation of securities. Initially, the Commission was charged with
facilitating equilibrium in the movement of capital by preventing an excess of
bids from disturbing the market. This function is no longer emphasized. The
Commission's primary role now lies in the second of the tasks originally
assigned to it: the establishment of guidelines to protect buyers from "being
led into error as to the real nature of the transaction or the legal rights attached
to the securities" [9]. As stated in its Reports, the Commission:
... need not be informed as to the economic or financial fitness of investments within its
jurisdiction. Its role is to examine information made available to the public so as to ensure it being
sufficiently complete so that an objective decision on the investment may be made (t0].
2.2. Jurisdiction of the Commission Bancaire
All takeover bids, regardless of their purpose or the type of companies
involved, are subject to the Commission's control procedure if four conditions
are present. These conditions require that the bid (1) constitute an offer to
purchase or exchange, (2) relate to securities or rights, (3) be open to the
public, and (4) affect the Belgian market.
2.2.1. Offer to purchase or exchange
Neither the Arret6 Royal, nor its history indicates what was meant by an
offer to purchase or exchange [11]. In defining this phrase, the Commission has
dispensed with traditional concepts of contract law and has construed it to
include any public transaction, regardless of its form, which is aimed at
convincing investors to contract. Thus, any public attempt to purchase shares
from shareholders is an offer to purchase or exchange. Whether an initiative
takes the form of a firm offer or merely a proposal and whether it eventually
results in the purchase of the securities is irrelevant, because the Commission is
concerned with the process and not its results [12].
The Arrt6 Royal covers not only offers to purchase, but also includes any
public exchange or offer to exchange [13]. Because exchange is not limited to
its narrow contractual meaning, it might have been more appropriate to use the
phrase "public offer to acquire" to describe the reach of the law [141.
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The Law of July 10, 1969, is consistent with this approach [15]. For
example, it equates an offer with a proposal to provide information or
financial advice, or even a proposal intended to elicit a request for such
information, where that proposal merely conceals a program of canvassing.
2.2.2. Offer relating to securities
Prior to the enactment of the 1969 Law, the information disclosure require-
ments of the 1935 Arrgt6 Royal were limited to traditional securities. Thus,
public offerings fell under the jurisdiction of the Commission only if the shares
involved stocks or beneficiary interests representing partnership rights, rights
in public or private hands, or any type of loan certificate. Because many
transactions easily avoided the Commission's supervision, the legislature passed
the Law of July 10, 1969, to broaden the Commission's jurisdiction to include
offers of interests in real estate and chattels where, because of the operation
and management of the property, the purchases assumed the character of
financial investments [16].
2.2.3. Public offer
Only public takeover bids fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
The character of the offer is determined by the same criteria used to dis-
tinguish between public and private securities offerings [17]. The rules applica-
ble to securities offerings were initially established through decisions of the
judicial and administrative courts. Under these rules, many operations which
were in fact public offers escaped classification as such and avoided ap-
propriate penal sanctions [18].
In response to this problem, the legislature enacted the Law of July 10,
1969, giving the King power to formulate the standards for determining when
securities transactions would be deemed public. Pursuant to this authority, an
order was promulgated (Arret& Royal of November 12, 1969) which broadened
the concept of public character [19]. The Arrat6 Royal established four tests,
the satisfaction of any one of which is sufficient to establish the public nature
of an offer [20].
The first test is the use of publicity. Any use of legal notice, newspaper or
magazine advertisements, or the circulation of documents relating to the
operation, even if addressed individually and upon request, will imbue the
offer with a public character [21]. In the Commission's words, the Arret Royal
aims at bringing under its control "any modem method of sales promotion
which tends to put the greatest possible personal touch in the relationship - or
even only preliminary discussions - with potential clients" [22].
The second test concerns the intervention of a middleman, other than a
bank or registered stockbroker. Under this test certain investment schemes will
be deemed public if the offeror employs specialized or general agents in order
to disguise what is, for all practical purposes, a direct approach to investors.
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The Arret6 Royal defines middleman as one who acts, even temporarily, as a
broker, commissioned agent, securities trader, seller or representative of the
offeror [23]. Financial analysts and consultants, however, will not be consid-
ered middlemen if their activity does not conceal the solicitation of investors.
In practice, this distinction has proven to be quite difficult to make [24].
The public character of a securities transaction may also be established by
the intervention of a bank or stockbroker. When these entities buy or sell
securities for their own benefit or when they act as agents for the operation's
promoter, however, their intervention will not imbue the operation with a
public character, provided that they demonstrate to the Commission that the
operation involves a limited number of investors [25].
The final test is one of quantity. Solicitation of more than fifty individuals
establishes the public character of the operation. Once again, exceptions are
made for bankers and stock-brokers [26].
Under these tests, the use of many modem marketing techniques. such as
organizational gatherings, informational meetings, and telephone campaigns.
renders a securities operation public [27]. Even individual offers to buy. if
effected systematically through repetitive offers, will be considered public by
the Commission.
2.2.4. Effect on the Belgian market
The 1935 Arrt& Royal, which created the Commission, was concerned with
the economic condition of Belgium. Therefore, the Commission's jurisdiction is
limited to transactions that take place in Belgium [28]. This jurisdiction is
triggered when a request is made to Belgian investors, even if it originates from
abroad. The promoter's nationality is irrelevant [29], and the Commission's
rules apply even if the purchases are ultimately made outside Belgium [30].
2.3. Means of enforcement: a praetorian law
The legislature gave little power to the Commission to enforce the control
procedure discussed below (see section 3). As the Rapport au Roi points out.
"... the Commission is not empowered to forbid a transaction" [31]. If the
Commission believes that a takeover proposal submitted for its inspection is
likely to mislead investors, it can do no more than notify the promoter and
recommend changes. Should the promoter refuse to comply with these sugges-
tions, the most stringent formal sanction the Commission can impose is to
suspend the takeover bid for three months, after giving advance notice to the
promoter. Upon the expiration of the suspension period, the Commission is
powerlesss to stop the takeover bid, and may only publish its complaints and
request the Minister of Finance to forbid admission of the new shares onto the
stock exchange.
The Commission's formal control, therefore, consists neither of authorizing
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nor approving transactions, but in issuing opinions of nihil obstat (no objec-
tion). Through this opinion, the Commission certifies that the proposed
transaction does not controvert the public policy of maintaining balance within
the capital market or that of maximizing the flow of adequate information to
investors [321.
Although the Commission's powers are rather limited from a strict juridical
view, it possesses significant de facto influence over companies planning to
launch takeover bids. Few corporations within its jurisdiction would continue a
transaction without the Commission's nihil obstat. The Commission has not
yet had to suspend an operation or publish objections; the threat of these
sanctions has proved to be as effective as the power of authorization would
have been.
Based on this pervasive influence, and upon a continuing dialogue with the
corporations it regulates, the Commission has developed a remarkable body of
praetorian law [33]. These laws consist of a series of basic precepts supple-
mented by the Commission's annual reports.
3. The control procedure
Belgian law provides no regulatory mechanisms specifically applicable to
takeover bids. The Commission applies, by analogy, the same control proce-
dure applicable to public issues. This procedure gives the Commission pre-
liminary control over the bid because only after the procedure will the takeover
bid become public [34]. The following subsections outline the major steps of
the control procedure and the information required from a promoter to satisfy
the procedure's requirements.
3.1. Notice and dossiers
The Commission must be notified two weeks prior to any takeover bid [35].
The notice, if accompanied by a complete dossier, will begin a two-week
waiting period [361. If the dossier is complete and the Commission has not
ruled on the proposal within two weeks of its submission, its inaction will
constitute an implicit nihil obstat [37]. If no dossier is attached to the notice or
if the dossier is unsatisfactory, the Commission will have all the time it
considers necessary to exercise its review powers [38].
The importance of the dossier to the Commission's two-fold objective is
illustrated by the flexible approach the Commission has taken in establishing
guidelines for that document's contents. Although the Commission has speci-
fied that certain items, such as a complete prospectus for shareholders and a
memorandum justifying the price offered, must be included in all dossiers, it
has also reserved the power to require additional information on a case-by-case
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basis. Failure to provide adequate information will, as noted above, render the
dossier incomplete. If the omission is intentional, or if incorrect information is
deliberately included, criminal sanctions may apply [39].
3.2. The nihil obstat
Although the law does not require it, the Commission has adopted the
practice of sending to the promoter a nihil obstat letter stating that the
Commission does not believe the takeover bid will disturb the financial market
or mislead potential subscribers. This decision, however, may not be publicized
by the Commission or noted in the advertising or documents related to the bid.
The legislature prohibits such notification in order to prevent the Commission
from being held responsible for the quality of the issue, which would otherwise
occur if its decisions came to be viewed as seals of approval.
The prohibition of publication results in the paradoxical situation that it is
impossible for investors and shareholders to determine whether a venture has
been submitted to the Commission. Although unreviewed takeover bids are
relatively uncommon, there have been several in the Belgian market. Thus, in
order to protect investors from misleading information, the Commission should
certify the documents it has reviewed. This is particularly true because there is
no civil remedy of notification of unreviewed takeover proposals.
3.3. The prospectus
As noted above, the dossier must contain a prospectus. The prospectus is
viewed by the Commission as the main vehicle for informing investors of all
relevant aspects of the proposed takeover. It must include information con-
cerning the promoter, the contract, and the target company.
3.3.1. Information on the promoter
Information on the promoter must include a description of the promoter, its
legal status, its main features, and a synthesis of at least three balance sheets
and profit and loss accounting statements. Furthermore, because it is im-
portant for shareholders to know who will control their company if the
takeover bid is successful, the prospectus must specify the composition of the
promoter's management and its dominant groups.
The prospectus must also state the promoter's purpose in making the bid.
This requirement, however, appears to be merely rhetorical. The Commission is
often satisfied with vague justifications and the declared objectives often do
not correspond to the promoter's real goals.
An example of the latter is found in a takeover bid by G.B. Enterprise
Company (hereinafter G.B.). The bid was launched in 1971 upon the shares of
Union Financi~re BUFA Corporation (hereinafter BUFA). The prospectus
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filed by G.B. stated that the operation "corresponded to the two-fold objective
of harmonious development of the commercial and financial potentials of both
companies", and that the tightening of the links between the two companies
would facilitate the development, through BUFA, of certain service activities
complementary to those of G.B. G.B.'s real reason for the bid was to defend
against private offers made to BUFA's Board of Directors to purchase BUFA's
shares of G.B. as part of an effort to gain control of G.B. Thus, after
transferring BUFA's 7.2% of G.B. into friendly hands two years later, G.B.
sold its BUFA stock at a loss.
This type of deception is facilitated by several structural limitations on the
Commission. First, the Commission does not have the means to conduct the
exhaustive economic analysis necessary to verify the truth of the promoter's
purpose statement. Furthermore, because the Commission does not have the
resources to conduct routine follow-ups in every case, it must restrict itself to
an occasional sanction, although technically reserving the right to interfere
whenever a promoter's actions belie its stated goals. The occasional sanctions,
moreover, depend upon shareholder complaints and upon voluntary compli-
ance by the investigated promoters with the Commission's decisions. Recent
cases have made it clear that the Commission's moral pressure is not always
sufficient to effectuate such compliance [40].
3.3.2. Information on the contract
The Commission requires that the prospectus reveal all relevant terms of the
contract, including the price, the period of acceptance, the quantity of shares to
be purchased, and any conditions which would free the promoter from his
obligations under the contract. With respect to these conditions, the Commis-
sion has adopted the contract law principle that there is no offer if it is made
under a condicio protestativa or if the promoter reserves too broad a power to
determine the circumstances in which he can revoke or nullify his offer [41].
The Commission requires that this power be expressly limited to objective
conditions, e.g. the percentage of variation of prices and indexes which will
justify revocation.
The Commission does not require the promoter to extend his offer to
purchase all outstanding shares of the target company. If the offer is restricted,
however, the prospectus must specify the conditions of reduction.
3.3.3. Information on the target company
(1) Valuation. The shareholder in a company that is the target of a takeover
bid needs certain information in order to determine whether the price being
offered for his shares is a fair one. He must be informed of the financial health
of his company, as well as the value of his participation. Thus, the prospectus
usually contains information as to the book value of the target company and
the value of his shares. The Commission requires that the prospectus include
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certain recent economic and financial data. As noted by the Commission:
Data will normally be taken from routine sources of shareholder information such as balance
sheets, profit and loss statements, and annual reports of the board of directors. To these may be
added statements made by the company during the year as weil as information extracted from
stock issue prospectuses [42].
Quite often, however, prospectuses do not convey to the shareholders a true
picture of their company's value. Prospectuses often reproduce only the latest
available balance sheet to which is simply added a chronological series of prior
years' profit and loss statements. Thus, shareholders are rarely apprised of
underestimations of the company's worth not revealed by the balance sheets.
One solution to this problem would be for the target company itself to publish
its own summary of its financial position to supplement that contained in the
prospectus.
Several methods are used to determine the value of shareholders' stock. For
example, if the target company has an official quotation on one of the national
exchanges, the prospectus may contain the highest and lowest quotations
during the last three to five years. Some prospectuses contain an average of the
quotations for a few months preceding the offer. These quotations, however.
are not very helpful unless viewed in context of the major stock transactions
during the relevant periods.
The Commission has been rather reserved in regulating stock valuation.
merely requiring that "the price offered must reflect the value of each share
insofar as practicable, taking into account .the uncertainties inherent in assets
evaluation" [43]. The Commission should go further and distinguish the right
value of each share in terms of whether the share is purchased as an investment
only, or as part of the purchase of control. The Commission did. in fact, seem
to imply such a distinction when, for counter-offers, it declared allowable a
price which reflects the offeror's own convenience [441.
(2) Equality among shareholders. In the majority of takeover bids that take
place in Belgium, the promoter has already acquired control from the majority
shareholders through private offers. Consistent with the principle of equality
among shareholders, the Commission requires that these promoters offer to
purchase minority shares under the same terms as were given to holders of the
controlling bloc.
This same terms rule is not a legal obligation, but a principle of good
conduct [45]. It has proven difficult to enforce for several reasons. Because it
relies on the word of the promoter and declines to make its own financial
evaluation of the price paid to majority shareholders, the Commission has no
idea whether a control premium has been paid under the table. In addition, the
Commission rarely exercises its power to lodge a legal complaint pursuant to
the statute, which makes the giving of false or erroneous information a
misdemeanor.
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A recent example clearly illustrates this problem. On January 18, 1978,
Continental Foods Corporation (hereinafter Continental) acquired through the
Banque de Benelux, 68% of the stock of Union Financi~re d'Anvers Bufa
(BUFA), a holding company, at the price of 530 B.F. per share. The bank in
this case was merely a middleman because it had acquired the shares shortly
before from Sodefina, also at 530 B.F. per share. Continental then agreed to
launch a takeover bid on June 20, 1978, at 526 B.F. per share. Continental
stated in its prospectus that this was the same price paid to acquire the
controlling interest. The minority shareholders did not accept the offer and
disputed the price, believing it to be well below the intrinsic value of their
shares. They then complained unsuccessfully to the Commission, which lacks
any power of investigation.
Following a lawsuit against Sodefina's former Managing Director, who
remained President of BUFA, it was discovered that he had received a control
premium of 860 B.F. per share. Faced with these facts, Continental launched
another takeover bid in December, 1981, at 1,350 B.F. per share, an amount
corresponding to the real price paid in 1978 for the controlling shares less
dividends paid since then. The Commission ultimately declared that the
principle of equality among shareholders had been respected, even though the
minority shareholders had to wait three years to receive the same price as had
been paid for the controlling interest.
4. Effectuating the takeover bid publication of information
In the ordinary course of events, once the Commission has received a
commitment from the chief bank stating that the promoter has sufficient funds
to purchase the shares, it will issue its nihil obstat. The promoter will then
announce his offer publicly by distributing copies of the prospectus via
banking circuits. A brief statement in the financial press will notify investors
that the prospectus is available. Generally, the offer will run for two or three
weeks, and acceptances will be effected by remittance of the certificate
attached to the prospectus to one of the participating banks. The chief bank
gathers these acceptances as well as the securities, and pays shareholders upon
remittance or later.
If the bid is successful, the Commission requires that the promoter accept
any remaining shares presented to him for several months after the bid. Thus,
shareholders who refused the bid initially have an opportunity to reconsider.
After the securities are received pursuant to the takeover bid and collected
by the chief bank, the Commission generally requires that the promoter
publish the results of the offer [46]. In certain cases, however, the Commission
has made exceptions. One such case involved a takeover bid by Investco
Corporation (hereinafter Investco) for 40,000 shares of General Biscuit Corpo-
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ration (hereinafter General Biscuit). Investco was acting for Neutlings and De
Beukelaer, two family trusts which, with a third, L. Parein, previously con-
trolled General Biscuit. Neutlings and De Beukelaer authorized the takeover
bid to defend their control of General Biscuit against the French Bank,
Worms, which had purchased L. Parein's 20.7%.
Investco did not publish the results of the takeover bid because Neutlings
and De Beukelaer were not certain whether they had acquired a majority
interest and publication might have alerted another shareholder, such as the
Worms bank, that it actually controlled General Biscuit's stock. The Commis-
sion, realizing the problem publication might cause, did not press for dis-
closure of the results of the takeover bid.
The Commission regulates the flow of information in yet another manner.
Lacking the power to suspend trading in shares, it combats insider trading by
having the promoter publish, even before completely examining the dossiers, a
notice stating the terms of the offer. The goal is to avoid the disruption of
natural market prices by preventing insider trading based on speculation and
rumor.
This practice has led to disastrous results because shareholders have no
guarantee that the promoter will meet the commitments embodied in the
notice. Thus, in January, 1974, the British firm, Valor Company, Ltd.
(hereinafter Valor), privately acquired 81.5% of the shares of Forges de Ciney
Corporation. Valor announced this acquisition publicly and confirmed via a
communiqu6 to the Bank of the Soci&t G~nrale de Belgique, which is charged
with ascertaining whether a takeover bid's conditions are fulfilled and with
surveying the subsequent evolution of the price of shares, that as far as the
remaining shares were concerned, it would comply with the recommendations
of the competent authorities.
On February 7, Valor issued a press release under the Commission's
supervision which read:
In case the average price for a Ciney share should be equal or inferior to 2,550 B.F. during a period
of three months following the publication of Ciney's trading results for the financial year ending
March 31, 1976, then Valor engages itself to launch a takeover bid on the 5,850 shares still held
publicly before the 31st of December 1976, at the price of 2,550 B.F. per share.
Subsequent to the release of this statement, Ciney's trading results proved to
be so catastrophic (toward the end of September the shares were quoted at
1,705 B.F.), that at an extraordinary general meeting its shareholders voted in
favor of a request for composition. The company was finally declared bank-
rupt on October 12, 1976.
As the conditions of the February 7 notice were fulfilled, the shareholders
vainly offered their shares to Valor, which refused to launch the takeover bid.
This situation left the Commission so totally helpless that it could convince
neither Valor nor the bank to observe its commitments. The Commission was
left to declare that, "unfortunately and notwithstanding several pressing
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demands, the majority shareholder has again stolen away, in fact repudiating
the solemn commitments it has agreed upon". As to its own powers, the
Commission noted that it "does not have the qualification to prosecute for the
accomplishment of liabilities toward the public" [47].
The Commission might have avoided all this if it had simply required from
the bank a guarantee to meet its obligations. The only recourse left to minority
shareholders was to sue Valor and the Bank of the Soci~t6 de Belgique for
fulfillment of their obligations. The case is still pending in court.
5. Counter-bids
The general procedure for counter-bids is similar to that applicable to any
takeover bid: notice and a dossier must be submitted to the Commission after
which a nihil obstat letter may be sent to the promoter. In addition, the
Commission has established rules specific to counter-bids to facilitate the goals
of shareholder equality and access to information. For example, as a rule, the
price of a counter-bid must be 5% greater than the original bid, and subsequent
bids must be at least 2.5% above the preceding offer. The Commission stated in
its annual report, however, that if these levels were not met it would consider
other relevant factors on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, it recognized that this
pattern of increasing prices creates problems in terms of the accuracy of the
proposed price and the stability and comparability of payments currency [48].
The terms of the counter-bid must be submitted to the first bidder, who is
required to assess it and respond. The Commission will also remind the boards
of directors of counter-bidding corporations that their duty to inform share-
holders includes, if not a formal choice between the bids, then at least a
comparison [49].
The Commission requires each promoter to release the shareholders who
would have accepted its offer if a counter-bid had been made during the first
offeror's validity period. This is supposed to put all shareholders on an equal
footing, allowing them to choose between competing offers [50]. However,
because this commitment is made to the Commission via private letter, rather
than to the shareholders, it loses much of its effect. It would be better,
therefore, to include such a clause in the prospectus.
6. Takeover bids by foreign corporations
This article began by noting that takeover bids are important to the
development of a capitalist economy. Takeovers initiated by foreign corpora-
tions, however, can cause problems of economic planning for the government.
The Belgian Government has taken action in response to such problems on
several occasions.
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Initially, a 1967 Arret6 Royal required the permission of the Minister of
Finance for takeover bids by or for legal persons whose residence or main
office was abroad and for Belgian corporations directly or indirectly under
foreign control [51]. Because the EEC complained that this inhibited the free
establishment of foreign companies in Belgium, in violation of the Treaty of
Rome, the Law was modified on July I1, 1972. Thereafter, takeover bids had
to be approved by the Minister of Finance only if made by or for (1) real
persons who are non-members of the EEC or (2) legal persons, public or
private, within the market but whose main office, central administration or
main establishment are not within the Community. Because the territorial
requirements of Article 58 are so vague as to allow many non-European
countries to pass as European, Article 108 is only partially effective in
protecting the public.
Another approach to the problem of foreign takeover bids taken by the
Belgian Government has been to require prior notification. Article 36 of the
Law of December 30, 1970 (pertaining to economic growth), requires a foreign
company to inform the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Regional
Economy if it is going to make a takeover bid for a Belgian company. The
legislature thought this necessary because of the consequences upon employ-
ment and economic planning [52]. The same disclosure is now required of
nationals under a law passed on August 17, 1973, when at least one-third of
the invested capital changes hands between companies whose activity takes
place in Belgium and whose capital is at least 100,000,000 B.F. These provi-
sions reflect a planned economy, where a passive policy is replaced by
permanent negotiation between the State and private enterprises [53].
7. Conclusion
An examination of the historical development of Belgian securities law
reveals that it did not develop around a central policy, but on an ad hoc basis
in response to particular problems. This is especially true of the Commission
Bancaire's control over takeover bids; its general body of praetorian law has
developed on a case-by-case basis.
While much can be said for the flexible approach utilized by the Commis-
sion, its refusal to codify its rules has created a climate of insecurity. The
Commission should replace its abstract and anonymous reports with annually
promulgated regulations illustrated by clearly specified fact situations. The
Commission should also use its power, under Article 72 of the Law of June 30,
1975, to require disclosure of information and to verify it on the spot.
Currently, the Commission feels that it should not use this power in the
context of public issues and takeover bids [54]. Finally, the Commission should
appeal systematically to the judiciary whenever it discovers violations of the
rules.
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